

Case Study El Salvador:

Goods for Guns: An Assessment of a Voluntary Weapons Collection Program¹

Abstract:

"This Goods for Guns program looks at a weapons collection program implemented by the business community in El Salvador as a result of the high circulation of arms in the country and the impact it was having on the economy. The program removed thousands of military-style weapons from circulation and helped to create a public security dialogue that has resulted in a more dedicated effort to confiscate weapons in the black market and implement progressive community policing efforts."

1. Problem: Destabilized society due to excessive proliferation of military-style weapons

By the fall of 1995 El Salvadoran society was suffering from the negative effects of the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons left over from a civil war which raged in that country from 1981 to 1992. The peace brokered by the UN in 1992 featured a major emphasis on disarming and demobilizing both the opposition forces of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional) and government forces of El Salvador (FAES). However the nature of weapons acquisition and recirculation during the war resulted in many thousands of weapons not being turned in as part of the peace process. It was these weapons and their well-documented negative effects, which became the target for action by societal groups and the international community starting in 1995.

1.1. Incomplete disarmament during peace operations

In what was considered one of the most successful disarmament operations in UN history, more than 11,000 guerillas surrendered more than 10,000 weapons, 74 missiles and 9,000 grenades at the conclusion of the war in 1992. The weapons of the FMLN were destroyed while those of the 30,000 troops of the government of El Salvador (FAES) were collected and stored. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a detailed breakdown of the weapons turned in by the FMLN. Due to twelve years of warfare that saw frequent ambushes and the free flow of weapons that rarely were formally accounted for by both sides of the conflict, massive amounts of weapons were left uncollected in El Salvador. The Government, the FMLN and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) estimated that approximately 360,000 military-style weapons remained in circulation and in caches.

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

1.2 Destabilizing factors to be dealt with by El Salvador

As a result of this incomplete disarmament and widespread availability of weapons, the following conditions remained to be dealt with in the fall of 1995:

- Criminal acts with military style weapons.
- Arming of private citizens and development of private security groups.
- Emboldening of disaffected citizens.
- Emerging post-conflict democratic political development threatened.
- Economic development stalled or threatened.
- Increasing harm to civilians.

1.3 Impact of Incomplete Disarmament on El Salvadoran Society: Identifying and responding to Structural and Proximate Indicators

The arrival of peace brought about the resolution of the issues initially responsible for the war. Yet, lack of resources and a worsening civil security situation placed undue stress on the country. Crime and violence were high in El Salvador, with citizens increasingly calling on the government and the newly formed and trained civilian police force (PNC) to invest more resources and effort in fighting crime and restoring civilian security. Violence was considered by a large majority of Salvadorans as the country's most pressing problem. In a poll published by the influential newspaper *El Diario de Hoy* on 29 July 1995, 90% of those interviewed said they had been the victims of street theft. The government through the Defense Ministry expressed the same serious concerns. Human rights activists and community leaders concurred.

With little tangible hope for the future, thousands took up arms and formed apolitical criminal gangs (*maras*) responsible for much of the violence affecting El Salvador. Every week public transportation was attacked and disrupted by criminals. At one point 50% of the bus service in San Salvador had to be suspended for security reasons. Hand grenades were becoming the country's main weapons of terror.

All of this violence, aided and abetted by a seemingly unlimited supply of small arms and light weapons, was taking place in an economy with a 50 percent unemployment rate. New businesses began to suffer since customers were afraid to travel. Similarly, assaults taking place along the country's main roadways were threatening the disruption of commerce, transportation and security.

There was little evidence that this growing criminal violence was connected in any way to broader political conflict. The FMLN had given up their arms in 1993 based on a promise of participation in a democratic political system, which by 1995 was a reality. Further, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants had been formally completed. As a matter of fact, the ex-combatants were now operating as a single voice demanding that the government meet their commitments for compensation agreed to in the DDR process.

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

2. The emergence of the voluntary weapons collection concept as appropriate to the Salvadoran context

As armed violence reached the critical stage in El Salvador in 1995, it became clear to all actors in society that the excessive availability of the tools of violence had to be addressed, along with the root causes. Immediately following the Peace Accords the government did develop a weapons collection effort, asking citizens to turn in weapons to designated army posts. Few weapons were turned in. In 1995, since the formal DDR process had been completed, it was not possible to have the UN reinstitute weapons collection.

In November 1995 a citizens group in El Salvador, including leaders of the business community, alarmed by the impact of this armed violence on the economy of the country formed the Patriotic Movement Against Crime (Movimiento Patriótico Contra la Delincuencia- MPCD). By April 1996 MPCD had decided to conduct a weapons collection program. ²The organization was formed for three key reasons. First, the Association of Distributors (consumer goods) of El Salvador (ADES) members were continually having their delivery trucks assaulted by men armed with military-style weapons. Second, ADES members were becoming increasingly concerned with the security of their employees in transit between work and home. Third, ADES was looking to collaborate with government and civil society to reverse the growing violence affecting all Salvadorans.³ It should be noted that this was not a grass roots program. No attempt was made to be inclusive of all levels of society. Had the opposition parties, especially the FMLN, been involved in the planning and implementation, the outcome would have been different, certainly spreading beyond the urban areas.⁴

3. The Goods for Guns Program

MPCD agreed on the following course and sequence of action for the weapons collection program:

- Develop Strategic Plan
- Seek the support of the Rotary Club of El Salvador, Catholic Church, Legislative Assembly, public security and defense authorities
- Designate a fundraising committee
- Design paperwork, forms, publicity, campaign materials and logistical details
- Seek the participation of the Association of Salvadoran Advertisers (AMPS) and that of all other modes of national mass communication
- Contract the services of a respected auditing firm
- Design a system for storage, transport and elimination of armaments
Estimate the quantity, and designate the final destination, of the weapons to be collected and destroyed
- Erect a peace monument (location, design and construction)

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 columns and 30 rows.

It was decided that the program would not be a 'buy-back' in the sense that the MPCD was purchasing weapons. Rather, citizens would be compensated for contributing to the development of a peaceful and secure future of El Salvador. The act of turning in weapons was the most important objective. As long as citizens continued to turn in weapons, the program would be successful. (Kiflemarian, BICC: *Report 12*, 1997)

3.1 Coordination with government

From the beginning the MPCD program was closely coordinated with the government. One reason for this was the fact that the organizations involved were those that reflected the interests of the middle and upper classes of El Salvador. These groups represented the key supporters of the ruling ARENA party of then President Armando Calderon Sol.

A second reason was that MPCD decided to focus on military-style weapons. This clashed with the recent passage of a law on firearms, ammunition and explosives, which prohibited civilians from possessing weapons exclusive to the military. Since this law would be an obstacle in the implementation of any Goods for Guns program, it was necessary to attain a temporary legislative decree that allowed all citizens to bear illegally held military-style arms, only and strictly, for the purpose of turning them in on the previously established dates at designated collection sites. After extensive lobbying by MPCD, the Legislative Assembly issued Decree 819, which allowed MPCD to implement, in strict keeping with the law, the Goods for Guns program.

The military and new civilian police force agreed to provide technical support to evaluate, store and destroy the weapons based on their different mandates according to law. They participated unarmed and out of uniform so as to not intimidate potential participants with actual armed police officers reachable nearby by radio. The Catholic Church provided its installations as collection sites throughout the country, the national association of advertisers provided free publicity on television, radio and in print media and the Rotary Club agreed to serve as an independent monitor of the entire process with observers at each collection site.

At the first collection session on 21-22 September 1996, citizens turned in not only firearms, but also ammunition, grenades, explosives and other articles not contemplated in the legislative decree. For that reason, MPCD initiated new discussions with the legislature to amend the original decree. This facilitated collection of the previously authorized firearms, ammunition, explosives and similar devices exclusively to the FAES and any other type of weapon not prohibited by the law and permitted for civilian use.

3.2 Weapons collection as part of a broader strategy to fight crime

From the beginning the Goods for Guns program was part of a larger concern with crime. It was also occurring in the larger context of other programs designed to deal with armed violence. The development of the PNC, was a major part of this, as the international community (e.g., UNDP) was assisting in programs designed to develop expertise in weapons tracing, seizure, and collection and destruction techniques. By January 1997, the PNC had succeeded in improving security in the two major areas where weapons, especially hand grenades, were being used- urban market places and public transportation.⁵

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

There is no evidence that the program was formally linked with larger public social and economic development programs funded by external assistance. The program was conceived and implemented by the business community, designed to create a climate more conducive to the development of the private sector economy in El Salvador, mainly San Salvador. Although some funding was secured from the governments of Canada, Norway, Mexico, Sweden, Luxembourg and the OAS, half of the funding came from the GOES and the national private sector. There were no formal links to the international community.

3.3 Timing and Duration

Goods for Guns was designed as a multi-phased program from the beginning. This fit with the longer-term objectives of raising awareness and fostering citizen participation in combating crime. The program was designed around collection weekends that were preceded by extensive publicity. In all 23 collection weekends took place between 21-22 September 1996 and 19-20 June 1999. The philosophy of the MPCD leadership was one of 'build it and they will come'. Several collection weekends were conducted with deficit financing. While the MPCD did make several marginally successful efforts to collect weapons in the country's interior, almost all of the collection efforts took place in the capital. The Catholic Church consistently provided the Cathedral in the heart of the city and Christ the Redeemer Church on the outskirts as weapons collection sites.

3.4 Storage and destruction

Given the sensitivity of collecting military-style weapons, whose possession was against the law, extensive procedures were developed by GOES to receive, store and destroy the weapons collected. The Logistics Division of the Ministry of Defense developed a set of procedures that called for the public destruction of arms that were collected. These procedures were much more than technical procedures. Objectives listed in the decree included:

- Effectively cutting the flow of weapons into the black market through collection and destruction
- Influencing public opinion in favor of the programs' continuity
- Publicizing the primary aim of the MPCD's Goods for Guns program as facilitating and providing incentives for the civilian population to exchange firearms and explosives exclusive to the FAES.

In addition to the military the PNC also participated in this phase of the operation. A very detailed set of procedures for the transportation and destruction of explosive materials collected by MPCD were developed by PNC Weapons and Explosives Division, charged with transporting and destroying all the explosive material. These procedures also recognized the larger goals of the program.

3.5 Collection and destruction procedures

Due to the failure of a previous government program which used army bases as collection sites, from the beginning the Goods for Guns program used churches as collection sites.

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

Each collection site was staffed by a minimum of nine people from the PNC, Ministry of Defense (MoD) and civil society.

The sites operated simultaneously from 8 am to 4 pm. Procedures for turning in a weapon included a welcome, a valuation of the weapon by the military, distribution by MPCD of a voucher for supermarkets, drug stores or clothing, and the recording of serial numbers. Weapons were stored and on Monday morning following each weekend of collection the MPCD gave a press conference in the PNC storeroom. After the press conference was over the PNC transferred control of all weaponry to the Ministry of Defense for destruction.

3.6 Documentation, transparency and publicity

Each weapon received was documented individually, with every form signed by representatives from the MPCD, Rotary Club, PNC and the MOD. All of the forms and paperwork provided a paper trail that ensured the transparency and legitimacy of the Goods for Guns program. Since the exchange is anonymous no prosecution of the persons surrendering weapons could take place. However, all weapons that were once part of government inventory were noted and reconciled with the government accounting of property.

The collaboration of the AMPS allowed for a strong publicity campaign throughout the twenty-three rounds of weapons collection. The week running up to the round of collection the MPCD began to advertise daily in the country's two largest print newspapers, *El Diario de Hoy* and *La Prensa Gráfica*, with the news of the upcoming event. In rural areas the message was disseminated through the radio at lunch hour when many people listen to the national news. In all of the Goods for Guns weekends peasants from far away places arrived to turn in weapons after hearing the announcement on the radio. Television was also used, mostly on the day preceding the round of collection.

3.7 Incentives

The incentives for turning in weapons were vouchers for supermarkets, pharmacies and shoe stores. The exchange values provided are listed in Table 2 in the Appendix. During the first rounds of Goods for Guns US\$ 15 was given for grenades and mines, but the large quantities of these artifacts made it impossible to sustain this level of reward. MPCD received ammunition but did not provide compensation. It is important to note that the MPCD did not "purchase" the weapons but rather "compensated" the person turning in his or her weapon for the gesture of peace and goodwill.

3.8 Scope of collection

A wide variety of citizens participated in the twenty-three rounds of collection. It should be noted that weapons were not turned in as part of the disarmament of militias or similar groups. By and large such groups had ceased to exist as the result of the DDR process. Weapons had proliferated widely among the citizenry and possessed them for a variety of reasons. Because the surrender of weapons takes place on anonymous terms very little testimony and information was gathered from the program participants, and there was no analysis of why the people had the guns, or what motivated them to turn them in.

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

4. Program Results and Evaluation

Through the end of the 23rd round of Goods for Guns held on 19-20 June 1999, thousands of pistols assault rifles and grenades had been turned in. Table 3 in the Appendix lists the total arms collected as of June 1999.

No systematic polling of the population took place in regards to the efficacy of the Goods for Guns program. The only evidence available is the steady stream of citizens that continued to turn in weapons during the 1996-1999 period. By far the most impressive aspect of the Goods for Guns program is the camaraderie between the different collaborators and the expression of goodwill (albeit undocumented) by those turning in their arms.

In its report on the MPCD program, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) concluded that "private and state initiatives similar to that sponsored by the MPCD have had a psychological as well as practical impact in El Salvador; the perception that a weapon is necessary for protection and self-defense has diminished. In a recent survey around 15% of San Salvador's citizens polled supported the view that owning a gun might be necessary for self-protection. Nevertheless, there is still a widespread concern over the levels of gun ownership, especially in the capital where 52,270 people carry weapons." (BASIC, 1997)

The *Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador* (Archbishop's Office for Human Rights) qualified the Goods for Guns program as a positive experience in that citizens were persuaded to surrender instruments of death and violence. However, the *Tutela Legal* did not think the program was efficient and the money spent on program administration and incentives could be better spent elsewhere. They pointed out that El Salvador was not less armed now than it was at the end of the conflict. Rather, 48,620 more new firearms were legally imported into the country during the Goods for Guns collection period. These figures do not take grenades and other military equipment into account. The legal firearms imported from 1 January 1996 to 1 June 1999 are listed in Table 4 in the Appendix. .

The argument can be made that most of these weapons are not designed to military specifications, thus less lethal, and are bought and sold legally. However, add to this the unknown quantity of weapons in the black market and it is easy to see that El Salvador was still a society armed to the teeth. If the MPCD's original and only goals were to remove a specific percentage of weapons from circulation in El Salvador, this could be considered a failure. But this was not the case. Regardless, it cast doubts about the efficacy of continuing with the Goods for Guns program without any restraint on the legal arms market. It is important to note that beyond the weapons collected there are significant intangible benefits of the Goods for Guns program in the area of civil society and governmental collaboration toward a common goal of reducing crime and violence. The lack of reliable statistics on firearm-related crime, injury and death within El Salvador, especially outside of the capital, makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of Goods for Guns on violent crime. From a public health standpoint, at minimum 9,527 weapons collected, and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition, represent thousands of accidents that did not happen and consequently more money can be spent on providing preventive health services to poor Salvadorans.

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

It would be naïve to believe that organized criminals and gangs would turn in their arms to a program that compensated weapons exchange for mostly non-cash incentives at below black market value. However, the MPCD and Goods for Guns have been successful in drawing attention to the fact that guns are designed to hurt and kill people. The collaboration with the PNC has helped to create a public security dialogue that has resulted in a more dedicated effort to confiscate weapons in the black market and implement progressive community policing efforts. Although the PNC is far from perfect it is a significant improvement over its predecessor. As of May 1999, the Salvadoran people qualified the PNC the second most trustworthy public institution in the country behind the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and ahead of the military and judicial system (IUDOP, 1999).

The MPCD also established a level of credibility and a reputation that permitted the institution to affect the passage of the new law on arms and munitions passed by the Legislative Assembly in June 1999. This law is far from perfect, and might even be considered pro-firearms by some, but it is a step toward increased control and scrutiny of weapons in society.

In conclusion, the MPCD Goods for Guns program has:

- Removed thousands of military-style weapons from circulation, comparable in quantity to those collected during the 1992 UN peace operation, thus preventing their continued circulation in an already saturated black market
- Demonstrated its autonomy and ability to mobilize resources from the public and private sectors within El Salvador
- Provided a systematic and well-documented set of procedures that can provide a model for programs to be developed in other countries
- Fostered relationships built over time between the private sector, civil society, media, government, police and military
- Demonstrated the possibility of conducting a public relations campaign on a national scale with the support of the media
- Demonstrated that it is possible to collect highly lethal and operating weapons from civil society concerned with their misuse in criminal activities

Shortcomings of the Goods for Guns Program:

- Funding, especially by donor states, was very uncoordinated, due to the issue of small arms and light weapons being very new to the international agenda. Those states and international organizations supporting the program did so mainly because of the global paucity of programs addressing the small arms problem.
- The organizers of the program were concerned primarily with the impact of small arms and light weapons on crime involving the middle and upper classes. As a result there was only a limited range of publicized negative effects from these weapons. For example the use of these weapons to violate the human

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 28 rows and 60 columns of dots.

rights of citizens was not part of the program. Also, this resulted in no link between this program and the overall economic development of the country. This was seen in the failure of the program to move outside of the city of San Salvador.

- There was no attempt to use the collection program to foster the development of other types of violence prevention programs (e.g., gang violence reduction programs, firearms surveillance systems, etc).
- While useful linkages developed between the private sector and the government, the program was not used as part of community building *per se*.
- Other than having citizens continue to turn in weapons, there were few programmatic objectives that could be used in evaluating the program. In addition, no attempt was made to interview participants as to their motives, experiences, etc., a technique that has been used successfully in other collection programs.
- The program was not linked to policies designed to limit the re-supply or restocking of weapons into the country during the program period. This factor was critical in donor states discontinuing their support of the program.

5. Final Note

One final point should be made about the impact of the Goods for Guns Program. By 2000 the donors had lost enthusiasm for a program that did not reduce the number of weapons in society.⁶ There was no announced end to the program, rather a trickling away of interest and eventually a halt. However, the program had succeeded in developing enough awareness that the media continued to cover the problems associated with small arms and light weapons into the year 2000. This awareness resulted in the government requesting UNDP to implement a small arms control program in the country.⁷ The program attacks the small arms problem as multidimensional and involves government, academic and NGO participants. To date achievements include a PNC firearm and violence database, anti-violence campaigns in schools, and a legislation reform project. Interestingly, the project does contemplate a weapons collection component but only when other preparatory steps have been completed.⁸ While it cannot be said that the MPCD program led to the current UNDP program, it is true that the publicity of the Goods for Guns program played an important role in making government action imperative.

©: The information provided in this product is for personal use only. None of it may be reproduced in any form whatsoever without the express permission of the author or the UN.

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

Annex 1

Table 1: Weapons Collected by ONUSAL 1992-93

Pistols	411
Assault rifles	8,268
Sub-machine guns	239
Machine guns	271
Grenade launchers	662
Mortars and cannons	379
Missiles	74
Munitions	4,032,606
Rockets	140
Grenades (hand, mortar and CN.57)	9,228
Explosives	5,107.1

Source: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, 1993

Table 2: Exchange Values for the Goods for Guns Program (US dollars)

Old or deteriorated pistols or rifles	60-85
Pistols, .22 caliber rifles and semi-auto rifles	60-175
Automatic rifles such as AK-47, M-16, Galil, etc	350
Grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and mortars	115
Grenades and mines	3 (cash exchange)

Source: Patriotic Movement Against Crime (MPCD), July 1998

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

Table 3: Weapons Collected by MPCD 1996-99

Pistols and short arms	1,354
Long arms including assault rifles	3,043
Grenades	3,180
Grenade launchers	44
Law Rockets	290
Detonator cord	84
Detonators	1,042
Blocks of TNT	277
C-4 explosive	147
Mines	55
Mortars	4
RPG-7	6
SAM-7 projectiles	1
Sub-total	9,527
Magazines	3,157
Ammunition	129,696
Total	142,380

Source: Patriotic Movement Against Crime (MPCD), August 1999

Table 4: Legal Firearms Imports to El Salvador 1996-99

	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Pistols	10,853	9,984	12,934	4,293	38,064
Rifles	5,942	2,802	4,609	1,860	15,213
Total	16,795	12,786	17,543	6,153	53,277

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

Annex 2

Acronyms

FMLN	Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional
FAES	Government Forces of El Salvador
ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
PNC	Civilian Police Force
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
MPCD	Patriotic Movement Against Crime (Movimiento Patriotico Contra la Delincuencia)
ADES	Association of Distributors of El Salvador
AMPS	Association of Salvadoran Advertisers
MoD	Ministry of Defense
BASIC	British American Security Information Council

References and further reading

British American Security Information Council. "Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in Central America." BASIC Occasional Paper No. 24, December 1997.

Gutierrez, David. 1999. 'El Salvador's Consumer Goods for Firearms Programme.' In Jayantha Dhanapala et al, Eds. 1999. *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research/Ashgate.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. *Estudio ACTIVA: La violencia en Gran San Salvador*, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, (San Salvador, May 1999).

Isacson, Adam. *Altered States: Security and Demilitarization in Central America*, (Washington: Center for International Policy, 1997).

Kiflemariam, Gebrewold (editor). "Converting Defense Resources to Human Development," Proceedings of an International Conference, 9-11 November 1997, Report 12 (Bonn International Center for Conversion, October 1998)

Laurance, Edward J. *The New Field of Micro-disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Brief 7. (Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996).

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 rows and 40 columns of dots.

Laurance, Edward and William Godnick. 2001. 'Weapons Collection in Central America: El Salvador and Guatemala.' In Sami Faltas and Joseph DiChiaro III, Eds. 2001. *Managing the Remnants of War: Microdisarmament as an Element of Peacebuilding*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

United Nations. The United Nations and El Salvador" The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IV (New York: UN Department of Publications, 1995).

Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas". Special Report, 21 March 1996.

Newspaper Articles (in order of appearance)

"Arzu: Hay delincuentes que son resabio del conflicto armas", *Siglo Veintiuno*, 1 July 1998.

"Se duplican los casos de niños heridos por balas", *El Diario de Hoy*, 2 December 1998.

"Destruyen 800 fusiles del FMLN en Nicaragua", *El Diario de Hoy*, 30 March 1993.

"Destruyen Armas Ocultas en Honduras por el FMLN", *El Diario de Hoy*, 3 April 1993.

La Prensa Gráfica, 28 June 1999.

El Periódico, 25 November 1999.

"Armas no registradas", *Siglo Veintiuno*, 4 August 1999.

"Cada mes: PNC decomisa unas 200 armas", *Siglo Veintiuno*, 25 October 1999.

"En busca de zonas explosivos", *Siglo Veintiuno*, 3 August 1998.

"Grenade kill seven", *La Nación*, 22 July 1998.

"Detona granada", *Prensa Libre*, 17 May 1999.

"Psicólogo frustra ataque con granada en colegio", *Siglo Veintiuno*, 18 June 1999.

A large rectangular area filled with a light gray dot grid pattern, intended for taking notes.

Footnotes

¹ Edward J. Lawrence was a consultant to the United Nations in 1995 and developed a UN weapons collection program for El Salvador. In addition from 1995 he directed the Security and Development Program (SAND- <http://sand.miis.edu>) at the Monterey Institute, which focused extensively on the weapons circulation and violence problem in El Salvador, as well as weapons collection programs globally. William Godnick joined SAND in 1997 and conducted a process evaluation of the Goods for Guns program in El Salvador in 1997-98.

² At this time, a new concept to address the tools of violence had emerged in other parts of the region. UN peace operations in Nicaragua (1992) and Haiti (1994) had employed for the first time a "gun buy-back" approach, in which citizens were asked to turn in weapons in their possession in exchange for rewards of some kind. In the Dominican Republic (1995) this approach was used in a country suffering from gun violence that was not part of a civil war but rather apolitical crime.

³ Second author's interview with MPCD staff, July 1998.

⁴ The UN weapons collection proposal of 1995 was inclusive, with the FMLN due to play a major role.

⁵ Interviews with PNC officials, January 1997.

⁶ Between 1994-1999, El Salvador imported 70, 889 weapons from the United States and was the sixth highest recipient of U.S. arms. William Godnick with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink. *Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Use in Central America*. Occasional Paper No. 5. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2002), p. 7. <www.smallarmssurvey.org>

⁷ The program is described at <www.violenciaelsalvador.org/sv/proyectos/armas_ligeras.html>

⁸ William Godnick and Helena Vasquez. *Small Arms Control in Latin America*. *International Alert*, March 2003, p. 28. < http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/SP_english.pdf>