

**New Remedies for an Emerging Affliction:
Toward a New Typology of DDR for
Failed and Collapsed States**



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Abstract

Dealing with ex-combatants in post-conflict situations is critical in maintaining state and human security while promoting much-needed economic and political development. In many cases, the standard international model of demobilization, disarmament, and re-integration of combatants (DDR) has served as an effective tool to engage these issues. However, for an emerging class of states often referred to as “failed states” or even “collapsed states” in political science parlance, and especially those suffering from “warlord politics,” the standard DDR model has thus far proven ineffective in addressing the problem of current and ex-combatants. This paper first examines key characteristics unique to failed and collapsed states that are not addressed in the standard DDR model and that also directly impact a state’s ability to contend with warlords and their private armies. The paper then closely reviews DDR efforts in Somalia and Afghanistan to illustrate the deficiency of the standard model in coping with the phenomena of rampant warlordism, the lack of existing institutions with meaningful national influence or legitimacy, and sustained economic failure. Next, the paper considers the need for new assumptions and tools for implementing DDR in these failed states. It concludes with recommendations for a new model and typology of DDR to deal with warlord politics in failed and collapsed states; this new model, called “Target Specific DDR,” or TSDDR, is based on a scientific phenomenon called “free-scale networks” and would serve as a much-needed bridge between the most common political and DDR strategies currently enacted in post-conflict environments.

The picture of the cover shows soldiers from a private militia in northern Afghanistan about to go through formal demobilization and disarmament.

The relationship between security and development has never been more prominently illustrated than in today's world, as numerous nations suffer from an all-too-familiar chicken and egg predicament: security is needed for economic and human development, but economic and human development is necessary for security. The countries hardest hit by this tragic phenomenon are those at the low end of the spectrum of political and economic development. Without the Cold War patronage system to prevent the collapse of countries with weak civil and social institutions, the populations of these nations endure continuous violence and conflict as various armed factions compete for power and legitimacy.

This persistent cycle of violence and terror has devastating effects on the population at large, hindering not only economic development but also threatening basic "human security," including peoples' rights to safety from chronic threats of bodily harm, repression, hunger, and disease.¹ In Afghanistan, for example, many relief organizations have suspended operations because of the murder of 12 foreign aid workers, the gang-rape of a female French aid worker, and the injuring of dozens of other relief workers in the past year. Attacks on aid workers have increased from an average of once a month to once a day, with predictable negative consequences on development operations.² Attacks against the local population are much more extensive. In Kabul, a newspaper editor who published a cartoon caricature of prominent Afghan political leaders relates, "Some armed men, some gunmen, came to my house and to my office. They threatened me. They said, 'Look, killing you is a very easy thing for us. Look, we have thirty bullets in our clips. I can shoot all these thirty bullets into your chest right now, and

¹ United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security (New York: United Nations, 1994). 23. This report is one of several sources outlining similar elements comprising "human security."

² Nicholas Kristof, "A Scary Afghan Road," New York Times 15 November 2003, Op-Ed.

there is no one who can stop us.”³ Elsewhere in the same country, peasants’ homes are bulldozed by warlords to create luxury housing; warlord militias routinely beat women and prohibit them from leaving their houses; armed factions slice off the noses of civilians as punishment for not adhering to “appropriate” religious practices. Rape, terror, murder, and extortion are all well-documented occurrences in countries like Afghanistan where “the lack of security, the rule of the gun,” as one German minister visiting the country explained, “affected the entire peace process.”⁴

To curtail the violence and crimes caused by armed combatants, particularly in post-conflict situations or in countries where conflict is ending, the international community has developed a set of policy instruments collectively known as demobilization, disarmament, and re-integration (DDR) as a solution to break the cycle of violence. Through this collective process, combatants transition from soldiers to civilians; in exchange for their weapons and severance from their army, they receive money, training, and other forms of assistance to re-join civilian life and productively participate in their communities. Providing combatants with viable alternatives to violence and criminal activity has proven critical in maintaining peace agreements, reducing bloodshed and threats to human security, and bolstering local economies for meaningful, sustainable development.

Unfortunately, the standard international DDR template has failed to curb the violence and threats to security and development in the two emerging categories of countries known in political science parlance as “failed” and “collapsed” states. Within the past 15 years in Somalia

³ Human Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing for Us”: Human Rights Abuses in Southeastern Afghanistan July 2003. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/afghanistan0703.pdf>>. Numerous other accounts of abuse and human rights violations are documented in this report.

⁴ Kirk Semple, “Afghans’ Political Prognosis Is Still Hazy, U.N. Panel Says,” *New York Times* 12 November 2003, A9. See also Carlotta Gall, “New Afghan Elite Turn Into Land Bullies: Modest Family Homes Bulldozed for New Development,” *Edmonton Journal* 21 September 2003, E12.

and Afghanistan, two of the most acute failed states, the miserable political and economic situations had deteriorated to new extremes, creating mass insecurity and a power vacuum that offered few incentives for terrified combatants to disarm and power-hungry warlords to demobilize their armies. The rise of warlordism in place of legitimate political leadership or civil institutions perpetuated armed conflict among factions competing for power and legitimacy.⁵ Further, the continuing anemia of their national economies makes re-integration extremely difficult as there is very little legitimate economic activity into which ex-combatants can be re-integrated.

To compensate for the deficiencies of the standard model in failed and collapsed states, DDR practitioners have begun experimenting with variations of the regular template, but without clear direction or much success. Significantly, in failed states, initiating the process of nation- and institution-building has become closely linked with the DDR process because DDR is the first critical step that warring factions can make toward de-escalating tensions, reducing armed conflict, and ultimately implementing a lasting peace. However, several countries are slipping perilously close to joining Somalia and Afghanistan on the extreme end of the failed states list, and new tools need to be forged to reverse this alarming trend toward extreme state failure. More specifically, practitioners need to adopt a new set of DDR assumptions and tools that will allow them to operate more effectively in failed and collapsed states. Toward that end of establishing a typology of DDR for failed states, a new tool called “Target Specific DDR (TSDDR)” offers a unique approach on confronting the problem of rampant warlordism within the conditions of failed and collapsed states. Combined with other modifications of the standard DDR template, the implementation of TSDDR can significantly assist the international

⁵ Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002) 5-9.

community transition between different but necessary political strategies in the extended process of state- and institution-building in failed and collapsed nations.

The Standard DDR Template

Before exploring in depth the problems related to DDR in failed and collapsed states, a brief review of the DDR process is in order. Usually, a single national organization coordinates with a competent outside body, like the United Nations, to organize and implement a DDR process. The specific DDR tasks and policies are usually tailored to the particular situation, but the following lists of DDR activities highlight some of the most common options. However, this review is not meant to be a comprehensive account of DDR since a substantial body of literature already exists covering the subject; rather, the definitions should serve as an introduction into a more detailed analysis of the underlying assumptions behind the DDR process and their level of success in failed and collapsed states.

First, as defined by the United Nations, demobilization is “the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace.”⁶ In this phase, combatants enter secure assembly areas or cantons where they are registered, quartered, provided medical care and sometimes basic counseling. Disarmament, addressed next, often occurs during this period. Combatants then usually attend a “pre-discharge” orientation in which they can receive civic education, vocational training, literary courses, personal and career counseling, and advice on their rights and benefits. Finally, they are discharged, at which time they are no longer considered combatants. In states engaged in sweeping security sector reform, some selected

⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment (New York: United Nations, 1999) 15.

personnel are immediately re-integrated into a nation's new army or police force. Most former combatants, however, receive official discharge documents, traveling expenses to their final destination, and information regarding local communities.⁷

The second phase, disarmament, is defined as, "The collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population."⁸ Disarmament can occur in several different settings. Most often, disarmament occurs during the formal demobilization process in designated cantons. Weapons are collected and controlled, then either stored, dispersed to the new national army, or destroyed. Sometimes, disarmament centers are created outside of the cantons, where individuals can voluntarily choose to turn in their weapons. Gun-buy-back programs, where anyone can turn in a weapon for cash and other commodities, are a basic but controversial method for reducing the absolute number of weapons in circulation, regardless of their condition or usability. In contrast to voluntary disarmament, peacekeepers or foreign forces can enforce an involuntary disarmament program, in which sweeps of houses, arrests, and the threat of force are all tools to coerce people to surrender their arms. Sometimes, the overall incentive structure for disarmament includes both of these "carrot and stick" policies.

The final re-integration phase constitutes, "...assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families' economic and social reintegration into civil society."⁹ Re-integration programs often include cash assistance, job placement, education for children and adults alike, pensions and counseling services for the disabled, or additional vocational training. Community acceptance of former combatants,


⁷ Ibid, 15. See also German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Model for Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes September 1996, 1-8. <[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/0/9d68bd6c9555704285256af40070dfa6/\\$FILE/ATTMSGAX/Se10.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/0/9d68bd6c9555704285256af40070dfa6/$FILE/ATTMSGAX/Se10.pdf)>

⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 15.

⁹ Ibid, 15.

especially after a particularly brutal conflict, can be difficult and time-consuming. Indeed, the successful re-integration of a combatant into society occurs on an open-ended time schedule, meaning that it could require several years. Further, sustained economic development and job creation, especially in weak economies already struggling with high unemployment, often requires a sustained commitment of assistance from outside donors¹⁰. But, the successful re-integration of a combatant is critical, for if this process fails, the combatant might return to crime and violence in order to sustain him or herself. As officials at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit in Canada concluded when reviewing the subject, “Demobilized fighters ‘tend to return to a life of violence if they find no legitimate livelihood, that is, if they are not ‘reintegrated’ into the local economy.’ For this to happen successfully, both ex-combatants and the local community must feel secure, and there must be opportunities for employment that can be sustained in the long term.”¹¹

The following chart clearly outlines the standard international DDR template:¹²



¹⁰ Kees Kingma, “Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-War and Transition Countries,” German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (Eschborn, Germany: Universum Verlagsanstalt, 2001)

¹¹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, G8 Conflict Prevention: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Report from the G8 Kananaskis Summit in Canada, 2002.

<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/index.html>>

¹² Graph taken from GTZ, Model for Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes.

This general framework has been developed through the work of several institutions involved in both the planning and execution of DDR in several countries around the world. International groups such as the United Nations, Catholic Relief Services, the International Organization for Migration, the International Labor Organization, and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) have all directly supported the implementation of DDR programs, while organizations like the World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and numerous individual countries contribute in planning and funding these operations. Some of the most successful DDR operations to date have occurred in El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Uganda.¹³

A review of the DDR literature allows one to identify several assumptions underlying the standard DDR model, and a few merit special consideration. The first key assumption underlying standard demobilization and disarmament is that some sort of legitimate force can fill the security vacuum. As one DDR analyst explains, “The fact is that people are unwilling to give up their guns until they know that there is some sort of protection for their families, for their property and what not.”¹⁴ Usually, the legitimate force filling the security gap is either the official army of the state or a sufficiently-sized international peacekeeping force.

The second assumption holds that the majority of people and the foreign community recognize the legitimacy of some central authority. The government must at least have the capacity to guarantee the security of the population, and it must also meet the basic obligations of governments toward its citizens in the form of social goods like education and basic

¹³ Kingma, 15-32.

¹⁴ Mark Sedra interviewed by Ann-Marie Michel, The Disarmament Trap Radio Netherlands, 7 July 2003. <<http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/afg030702.html>>

infrastructure.¹⁵ The government is expected to play a significant role in the DDR process and functioning civil institutions are ultimately necessary to legitimize and sustain efforts for peaceful accommodation after an internal conflict. High levels of corruption and patronage politics can also significantly erode the perception of legitimacy in any given central authority.

Third, the standard DDR template usually assumes that some form of political consensus already exists among warring factions so as to push the demobilization and disarmament process forward.¹⁶ This often occurs through a peace treaty or accord, although such formal arrangements are not always necessary or forthcoming. The vast majority of countries with DDR projects established a consensus toward peace among the two or at most three warring factions involved. Without a general consensus toward peace, political accommodation, or some other outcome that looks beyond the current conflict, the continued presence of other armed groups deters other warlords and combatants from engaging in a significant DDR process.

Fourth, re-integration requires that the national economy, in addition to local communities and local economies, is capable of absorbing and sustaining an influx of new labor. Successful re-integration assumes that the integration of ex-combatants into local communities will not spark violent competition for scarce resources or a new crisis.¹⁷ Job creation is usually presented as an ideal solution, but the mechanics of achieving job creation are tricky and unpredictable even in developed, industrial nations. In many cases, the assimilation of ex-combatants into official national armies or police forces serves as an outlet for ex-combatants seeking new employment.

¹⁵ Provisions of state obligations and responsibilities drawn from Robert Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* Summer 2002, 85-96.

¹⁶ Although not explicitly mentioned as an "assumption" in the article, the author drew this conclusion from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 18-21.

¹⁷ Although not explicitly mentioned in this article, the concept behind this assumption largely stems from International Organization for Migration, Demobilized Former Combatants Return and Reintegration <[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/0/9d68bd6c9555704285256af40070dfa6/\\$FILE/Demobilisation%20%20IOM.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/0/9d68bd6c9555704285256af40070dfa6/$FILE/Demobilisation%20%20IOM.pdf)>

A fifth related assumption is that the resources exist, whether through foreign donor aid or national coffers, to facilitate and sustain the transition of combatants into their new civilian lives and careers.¹⁸ Vocational training, education, pensions, counseling, job placement, subsidies, work tools, land for farming, and the provision of food all constitute critical elements in a sustained re-integration program, but the sums required for these projects can quickly accumulate depending on the number of combatants targeted for re-integration and the relative quickness in which the community and economy accommodates them. A final corollary for the successful re-integration models holds that there is a lack of illegal markets that offer greater financial incentives than legitimate economy activity, and that significant numbers of re-integrated ex-combatants will not be drawn to illicit economic activities.¹⁹

Failed and Collapsed States


Since the end of the Cold War, political scientists have marked the emergence of two new categories of nation-states, known as “failed states” and “collapsed states.” Without the Cold War patronage system, under which nations with weak leadership and civic institutions were bolstered by superpower patrons in exchange for some degree of support, the institutions and economies of many of these countries simply collapsed.²⁰ As Robert Rotberg, head of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict, explains, “Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy and, in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself

¹⁸ This assumption is suggested rather than explicitly mention in Kingma, 15-32.

¹⁹ Kingma, 15-32; William Reno, (Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) 1-30.

²⁰ Rotberg, 85-96; Reno, 1-30.

becomes illegitimate.”²¹ Conflict erupts in these countries as various groups compete to fill the power vacuum and establish the legitimacy of their power; this escalation of violence further threatens and erodes the traditional civil and social institutions that normally influence governance and promote the welfare of the population. Other common descriptions of failed and collapsed states highlight their tendencies to “prey” upon their own citizens; the enduring nature of violence; an inability to reconcile ethnic disputes; an inability to control borders; a marked escalation of crime and violence; and its “utter incapability of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.”²² The following diagram serves as a simple illustrative tool on which one might compare the political, economic, and social development of nations, and identify other states with similar conditions.²³ A collapsed state represents the extreme end of state failure.



²¹ Rotberg, 85.

²² Ibid, 85-96. Also Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy* Winter 1992-1993, 3-20.


²³ The positioning of the countries in this state typology reflects the author’s perceptions of how a select few states would compare along this spectrum for illustrative purposes only. The positioning of the countries does not reflect the result of a quantitative variable analysis.

Of course, in order to precisely evaluate a country's placement along this spectrum, one would need to define a set of relevant variables and establish a method to quantify and assign meaningful values to measure those variables. The literature exploring different typologies of states, particularly failing and failed states, presents a budding avenue of research; but, for now, this paper will limit its examination to a specific set of variables that most directly and significantly affects the implementation of the standard DDR template.²⁴ More specifically, the following list of broad yet critical variables contributes to identifying and defining failed or collapsed states, but these variables also represent situational conditions that are incompatible with several of the basic assumptions underlying the standard DDR model, thus explaining in part why standard DDR has not worked in these categories of countries. Although the development of specific measurements of variables is beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis presented could contribute to future on-going research efforts to define common standards of measurement. Further, instead of employing specific values for each variable, this report relies upon the use of illustrative indicators and events to demonstrate the extreme level of failure and collapse in the cases presented.

The first critical variable for consideration in defining a failed and collapsed state, and that directly impacts DDR implementation, is the perceived level of legitimacy of a country's governance. This variable not only includes the level of legitimacy of the national leadership, but also the perceived legitimacy of key civil institutions capable of influencing government. Examples of such civil institutions include the courts, the army, agencies for financial and banking regulation, the police force, and various other government ministries. The importance of the role of patronage politics constitutes another sub-variable of legitimate governance. A

²⁴ For the most thorough statistical analysis of characteristics defining failed and collapsed states, see Jack Goldstone, Ted Gurr, et al., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2000. <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/>>

rather than collective public-interest.²⁶ Incentive structures meant to influence warlords' behavior must recognize this reality. Concurrent with the rise of warlordism, the state's inability to monopolize the means of violence also indicates that it lacks the power to guarantee security to its population, further de-legitimizing any central authority. The diagram below illustrates the level of warlord politics.



A third central variable defining failed and collapsed states is the level of illegal economic activity relative to the formal economy. In collapsed and failed states, the level of illegal economic activity relative to the formal economy is extremely high.²⁷ In these cases, the formal economy has largely collapsed. High unemployment, inflation, minimal foreign investment, and significant debt generally characterize the economies of these states. Under such conditions, the general assumptions for re-integration under the standard DDR model cannot be met. The economy already cannot supply enough jobs, and the domestic resources do not exist to sustain re-integration programs. Thus, re-integration resources and subsidies to sustain unemployed combatants looking for work must come from foreign donors. Unfortunately, foreign donors often suffer from “donor fatigue” and fail to distribute enough money to cover the full DDR project. Instead, people turn to illegal markets, such as drug production, to earn a living. Unfortunately, these illegal markets often perpetuate cycles of

²⁶ Marina Ottaway, “Democratization in Collapsed States,” in *Collapsed States* ed. by I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) 243.

25,000 civilians and reduced one-third of the city to rubble.²⁹ “Northern Alliance” *mujahidin* warlords violently contested the rise of the theocratic Taliban in 1996, and these loosely allied warlords maintained autonomous control over many parts of the country. Since the US-led attacks on Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban from Kabul in late 2001 and early 2002, an interim government has been appointed consisting mostly of the warlords who opposed the Taliban but still frequently clash with each other.³⁰ Researchers now estimate that there are currently 8-10 million guns in the country; and, with its population around 25 million, Afghanistan is one of the most heavily-armed countries in the world.³¹ An estimated 500,000 to 800,000 combatants currently bear arms.³² Further, the World Bank has estimated that Afghanistan contained the most mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) in the world, with estimates of up to 300 people triggering mines/UXO per month.³³

Small-scale DDR projects have been implemented in specific communities around the country, but consistent reporting regarding the deteriorating security situation throughout the country suggest that the results of these efforts have been insignificant at best.³⁴ A national DDR project suffered numerous delays before finally launching in October 2003. This new program, titled the “Afghanistan New Beginnings Project” (ANBP) and initiated by the current Afghan administration with the assistance of the United Nations, ultimately aims to disarm and demobilize 100,000 combatants at an estimated cost of \$41 million. While presenting new

²⁹ William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 204-205.

³⁰ For an example of conflict among warlords, see “Rumsfeld Meets Warlords in Afghanistan,” *New York Times* 4 December 2003.

³¹ Sedra, “The Afghan Development Trap.”

³² Mark Sedra, *Challenging the Warlord Culture*, 39.

³³ World Bank, *Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction* January 2002. <<http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Countries/Afghanistan/CB1C6A33FB68218485256B44004B58E5?OpenDocument>>

³⁴ The results of two small-scale DDR efforts in northern Afghanistan are outlined in International Crisis Group, *Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan*, 8. Another problem with these programs was that each faction stored the weapons its combatants surrendered, so the weapons never left the control of each faction.

strategic rhetoric of “removing the support structure beneath Afghan warlords by disengaging their lower-level commanders and troops,” the new program offers the same standard template of tools, including “individualized counseling, vocational training, and job creation,” but it does not specifically address the how to adapt to the operational realities of limited resources, warlord politics, or the extreme fragileness and limited authority of national governing institutions.³⁵ Without the adoption of new tools to compensate for different assumptions and conditions, success in undercutting the warlords’ support structure will remain elusive for the same reasons the smaller DDR projects were ineffective.

The first failed-state condition that the standard template of DDR has not been able to handle in Afghanistan is the lack of legitimate governance. The president does not have power outside of Kabul, and the countryside remains in the hands of warlords who support the administration in Kabul only in so far as doing so preserves the general power status quo.³⁶ The new national army numbers only 3000 to 4000 troops, and the national police force is even smaller, meaning that they are incapable of disarming the factional militias or filling the security vacuum that would follow.³⁷ Thus far, attrition rates in the new army range anywhere between 30% and 50% due to poor pay and lack of other essential resources. The police fare no better, and many officers remain on the pay of warlords to supplement their income.³⁸

With no national force capable of filling the security vacuum, this job falls to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is widely acknowledged to not be large enough to fill this vacuum either.³⁹ Currently, 11,500 US troops roam Afghanistan in search of

³⁵ International Crisis Group, Disarmament and Reintegration In Afghanistan, 7.

³⁶ Frank Wisner II et. al., Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace? Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, June 2003, 1.

³⁷ Sedra, The Afghan Disarmament Trap.

³⁸ International Crisis Group, Disarmament and Reintegration In Afghanistan, 5.

³⁹ Wisner II, 1.

Taliban and Al-Qa'ida militants and have demonstrated little interest in managing the conflicts between warlords. On the contrary, the United States acknowledged the necessity of employing these warlords to hunt the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida, and provided millions of dollars and weapons that have further strengthened the warlords.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the official peace-keeping force ISAF, recently transferred to NATO's control, stands at only 5000 men and rarely operates outside the capital. For its own military and political reasons, the United States has rebuffed calls for expanding ISAF both in terms of its numbers and area of operations. Many experts estimate that a peace-keeping force between 27,000 and 45,000 soldiers would be necessary to fill the security vacuum and enforce the demobilization of private militias.⁴¹ Until policy shifts or the Afghans significantly bolster their national forces, large-scale demobilization and disarmament of the warlord armies is not feasible.

Further, wide-scale corruption and patronage politics within the government also dissuade combatants from laying down their arms, which they see as their only means of security. For example, the warlord Mohammad Qasim Fahim emerged as one of the most influential and prominent Northern Alliance warlords and was appointed as head of the new Ministry of Defense. Fahim is an ethnic Tajik and maintains an uneasy truce at best with other ethnically diverse warlords in the administration. The amount of influence and control that Fahim's ministry has accumulated in respect to national DDR efforts has other warlords and civilians worried that Fahim's faction will be able to co-opt the DDR process, ultimately pushing the disarmament of other factions while using the captured weapons to strengthen his own

⁴⁰ Detailed throughout the book by Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden (New York: Random House, 2003).

⁴¹ Doug Lorimer, "Afghanistan: US-Led Occupation Forces Face Growing Armed Resistance," Green Left Weekly June 2003.

private army.⁴² The mistrust and concern stemming from corruption and patronage politics in the government, and the impotence of the national government to operate outside Kabul, thus undermines two key assumptions underlying the successful implementation of the standard DDR model.

Additionally, the existence of at least a dozen warlords with armies capable of challenging the new government's central authority makes achieving any political consensus extremely difficult at best. Several warlords, although "loyal" to Karzai's administration, continue to wage bloody battles between each other. In addition to Taliban fighters, a couple significant warlords, like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, are in direct opposition to the new administration. Achieving a political consensus among so many factions regarding disarmament and demobilization has proven impossible so far. Even with the new national DDR initiative "supported" by some warlords, reports in the north document the slow progress because warlords hostile to each other refuse to turn over significant armaments.⁴³ Without this political consensus, large-scale demobilization as required by the standard DDR template has yet to materialize. But, even if the target 100,000 combatants were somehow demobilized, the country still has anywhere from another 400,000 to 700,000 combatants for warlords to recruit and mobilize.

Also, the Afghan economy is in shambles, with unemployment already extremely high, and the demobilization of large quantities of soldiers at this stage would only exacerbate tensions in competition in communities over scarce resources. Although exact economic data for the country does not exist, one illustration of the economy's failure concerns the level of starvation facing the nation's inhabitants. Before the US invasion of Afghanistan, the UN World Food

⁴² Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: UN to Launch Long-Delayed Disarmament Program," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 20 October 2003.

⁴³ Amir Shah, "Feuding Afghan Warlords Hand Over Weapons," Associated Press 12 March 2003.

Program was feeding 3-4 million people poised on the edge of starvation, with the total rising to 7 million in the winter of 2001-2002. Although that immediate crisis has somewhat improved, millions still remain in jeopardy of starvation.⁴⁴ Further, measures to “create jobs” and “stimulate the economy” are likely to take years, if not decades to achieve. The high level of unemployment alone suggests that an influx of more unemployed labor would continue to severely strain the system. As one analyst explains, “Often, these militia groups are the only employment opportunity for Afghans. And also, this is the only thing they know... they only know war, this is the only tool they have.”⁴⁵

The current incentives for demobilization consist of \$200 in Afghan currency, 130kg of food, counseling, and either an assistance package or vocational training.⁴⁶ That means disarming 100,000 combatants, assuming each has one weapon, accounts for nearly half of the allotted DDR budget, before one even considers the costs for the food rations, education, training, pensions for the disabled, and all the other programs designated to assist in re-integration. The reality is that enough resources do not exist at the moment to demobilize 100,000 combatants, let alone 500,000. Clearly, the Afghan government is not capable of funding all the country’s development projects. But the international community also has not met its pledges to sustain Afghanistan’s development projects, including DDR. Additionally, the amount of support pledged in the Tokyo donor conference failed to come close to the estimates of aid needed for the projected development projects. Most countries or institutions that pledged aid have failed to distribute all of their funds. Embarrassingly, the White House even forgot to include aid to Afghanistan in its proposed FY2003 budget; a Republican senator later added over

⁴⁴ Douglas Franz, “Refugees From Afghanistan Flee Out of Fear and Find Despair,” New York Times 30 September 2001: 1B. Also Elisabeth Bumiller and Elizabeth Becker, “Bush Voices Pride in Aid, but Groups List Hurdles,” New York Times 17 October 2001: B3.

⁴⁵ Sedra, The Afghan Disarmament Trap.

⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, 7.

\$300 million.⁴⁷ Making the situation worse, most countries have not disbursed the full amount of their pledge obligations. In a speech to the General Assembly last September, Karzai chastised, “We would like to remind our friends that the majority of the financial pledges made to Afghanistan in the Tokyo Conference are still unfulfilled.”⁴⁸ There is a growing sense in Afghanistan, illustrated by Karzai’s repeated desperate pleas for assistance, that the country is being forgotten once again.⁴⁹

For example, the World Bank estimated that over \$10.2 billion would be required over 5 years to finance the scheduled development projects; over 10 years, development costs would be between \$11.4 billion and \$18.1 billion.⁵⁰ In the critical Tokyo donor meeting, only \$5.25 billion was pledged over the first 5 years, with \$1.8 billion of that amount set aside for the first year (2002) alone. A comparison of this sum with actual aid spent in four other recent post-conflict situations in dollars per person demonstrates that the average spent on each Afghan between 2002 and 2006 will only be \$42, whereas the next lowest per-person recipient was Rwanda in 1994 at \$193 per person. To achieve comparative per person spending with other post-conflict reconstruction scenarios, over \$6 billion would have had to been pledged for Afghanistan in 2002, and over \$30 billion through 2006.⁵¹

Furthermore, even though the \$5.25 billion pledged is designated for reconstruction, the majority of it has been spent on emergency relief, which is supposed to come from a completely

⁴⁷ Michael Buchanan, “Afghanistan Omitted From US Aid Budget” BBC News 13 February 2003
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2759789.stm>

⁴⁸ Care International, Policy Brief: Rebuilding Afghanistan: A Little Less Talk, A Lot More Action 1 October 2002:
1. <http://www.careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/09302002_policybrief.pdf>

⁴⁹ Robert Fisk, “Don’t Mention the War in Afghanistan,” ZMag 5 February 2003
<<http://www.zmag.org/ZNET.htm>> and Natasha Walter, “How We Forget About the Women of Afghanistan,” The Independent 20 December 2002.

⁵⁰ World Bank, Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction.

⁵¹ Care International, Policy Brief: Rebuilding Afghanistan: A Little Less Talk, A Lot More Action, 2.

different relief fund separate of the reconstruction package.⁵² As Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained in Tokyo, “10 billion...is the estimated cost of reconstruction [over 5 years]. This is separate from and must be additional to any commitments already earmarked for humanitarian relief.”⁵³ So, the on-going insecurity in the country has stifled reconstruction by diverting reconstruction funds toward emergency relief, while countries balk in meeting their reconstruction pledges, let alone humanitarian aid pledges, perpetuating the cycle of poverty and insecurity.⁵⁴

Concurrently, the return of intensive opium production has proven to be the biggest boon for the Afghan economy in years. Although the warlords who control the poppy production and trade garner most of the profits, the fact that Afghanistan has quickly become the world’s leading opium producer, 75% of the world’s supply, indicates that farmers are finding greater financial incentives to produce opium as opposed to legitimate crops.⁵⁵

In summary, the few small scale DDR programs that have been implemented have been ineffective mostly because the certain realities on the ground are incompatible with several key conditions necessary for traditional DDR. The lack of trust in a legitimate central authority, the lack of a legitimate group to fill the security vacuum, the actions of warlords to stall the DDR process, the lack of political consensus among warlords, the inability of the economy to absorb large numbers of unemployed labor, and the lack of resources to subsidize and sustain combatants in the re-integration stage as efforts at job creation, economic stimulation, and development get underway, all account the inability of the small DDR projects to prevent the

⁵² Ibid, 3.

⁵³ Ibid, 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 3.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, 13. Kristof, “A Scary Afghan Road.”

security situation from worsening. Further, the national ANBP DDR process will most likely run aground unless it can adapt to the environment of a failed state.

Somalia

Researchers generally regard Somalia as the prime example of a collapsed state. No viable, legitimate government exists, no civil institutions exist, rampant warlordism plagues the country, violence has persisted since well before the fall of Said Barre's regime in 1991, and a significant portion of the shattered subsistence economy revolves around arms sales and illicit markets.⁵⁶

Historically, Somalia has been comprised of a wide collection of scattered settlements and clans than a unified country. The country gained independence and "became one, at least on the map," despite continuing clan rivalries.⁵⁷ The military dictator Said Barre seized power in 1969 and held on until the end of the Cold War in 1991, initiating a series of brutal and repressive policies that stirred other clans to mobilize against him.⁵⁸

The collapse of the state and the violent rivalry between major warlords in the country prompted a "humanitarian" intervention by the international community. Much has been written about the lack of a clear international mission in Somalia during the early stages of its operations, but the nation-building exercise in the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) contained a limited plan for DDR, restricted mostly to the goal of disarmament in secured cantonments, without official re-integration or the pre-re-integration procedures usually enacted during the demobilization stage.

⁵⁶ Peter Marwa, A Presentation on Practical Disarmament, Developing Capacity for Peace, and Small Arms Control in the Horn of Africa Bonn International Center for Conversion, 10 July 2001. <http://www.bicc.de/events/unconf/workshop_marwa.html>

⁵⁷ Marc Lacey, "The Lesson of Somalia: Just a Humpy Dumpty Story?" New York Times 26 November 2003.

⁵⁸ Helen Metz, ed., Somalia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1993) 163.

This particular DDR mission was doomed from the start because it lacked a re-integration program to sustain peace. But other problems implicit in the standard application of disarmament plagues this operation. First, the removal of weapons created a security vacuum as those without weapons became more dependent on entrenched warlords for safety. Some warlords demonstrated a willingness to take advantage of the disarmament situation to consolidate their power; and, the subsequent limited operations, then removal, of the UN peacekeeping force signified the international community's lack of willingness to allow its international force to fill that security vacuum.

Second, the lack of a legitimate central government in Somalia significantly affected the strength of disarmament incentives. Examples indicative of the collapse of Somalia's government include the fact the five different men currently claim presidency of the country, and dozens of warlords have established virtually autonomy for themselves from individual city blocks in Mogadishu to remote villages.⁵⁹ The United Nations or other DDR groups cannot effectively negotiate DDR programs with five different leaders. Additionally, the absence of a legitimate government and other judicial and law enforcement branches meant that people saw the continued personal possession of weapons as the best way to protect their persons and property.⁶⁰ Others turned to clan warlords to fill the role of community providers, which then served to strengthen their power base and ability to strive for greater levels of national power. Further, without a legitimate central authority, people do not trust that the government can or will provide critical re-integration benefits and jobs that often serve as the most persuasive incentives for individual disarmament and demobilization. Finally, the recognition of high levels

⁵⁹ Lacey.

⁶⁰ Marwa.

of corruption and patronage politics meant that people have little faith that the government will provide for their security or look out for their economic interests.⁶¹

The disarmament operations were also implemented without the standard political consensus among warring factions that peace and some form of DDR was in their best interests. On-going internal conflict meant that a political consensus among warlords did not exist; further, the eruption of conflict between peacekeepers and local militias undermined on-going international efforts to establish such a consensus. As a result, disarming and demobilizing significant numbers of combatants proved impossible because the warlords would not accept such a threat to their power structures.

Finally, the international community demonstrated a complete lack of willingness to tackle significant economic reform and subsidize re-integration programs with the intent of promoting skilled labor and stimulating the economy. Instead, many combatants were tempted to engage in illegal economic activity, such as gun running, as a substitute for legitimate work.⁶²

For the first time since the United Nations withdrew from the country in 1995, a new national DDR program is being designed between elements of the interim government and the United Nations to demobilize between 60,000 and 80,000 militia members, but the details of how the plan will address the issues of warlords, the possibility of a security vacuum, the financial lure of illegal markets, and how to ensure job creation and non-threatening competition for scarce resources between communities and re-integrated combatants across the country.

⁶¹ Irin, "Somalia: Corruption Scandal Hits Transitional National Government," [Africa Online](http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,3730.jsp) 28 June 2001
<<http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,3730.jsp>>

⁶² Despite an international embargo on arms flowing into the country, Somalia, especially Mogadishu, maintains a vibrant gun trade. Mogadishu alone has four large open-air gun markets in which almost any type of hardware can be bought. See Osman Hassan, "Business As Usual at Mogadishu's Gun Markets as UN Meets to Stem Illegal Arms Flow." International Action Network on Small Arms, 9 July 2001.
<http://www.iansa.org/oldsite/news/2001/jul_01/business.htm>

Toward a New DDR Typology⁶³

Due to the lack of a sound framework of national governance, the role of DDR in a failed state tends to reflect the international community's dominant political strategies for developing and legitimizing that state's civil, social, and economic institutions. Two major political strategies for state- and institution-building currently exist, and both have significant implications for DDR regarding the form and implementation of DDR. And, while each political strategy parallels its own variations of the standard DDR model, a third, new DDR model can serve to facilitate a transition between the short-term and long-term political strategies to enhance the immediate prospects of reducing warlord-initiated conflict and violence. Accordingly, the three models of DDR proposed below are as much a reflection of political reform as they are technical strategies for coping with armed combatants.

Accommodation Demobilization and Disarmament (ADR)

The first political strategy sometimes implemented in failed states in order to begin establishing legitimate institutions of governance is called the "Accommodate Existing Forces" model.⁶⁴ The underlying assumption in this model is that the warlord forces that survived state collapse and anarchy are capable of serving as the foundation for a new enduring order. These institutions are considered to have at least some semblance of legitimacy by virtue that they

⁶³ Although the two different political strategies addressed in this paper have been covered by other authors, the analysis of the corresponding DDR programs is mostly original. The labels and acronyms are all original and not used among researchers or practitioners in the field. The third strategy of TSDDR is an original formulation by the author.

⁶⁴ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995) 70-72.

survived anarchy and state collapse, and now they attract a significant following by providing some level of assistance and protection for its members.⁶⁵

Establishing and deepening a political consensus among the warlords and militias becomes a primary objective, as opposed to accountability for past crimes like human rights violations, or actively promoting new institutions that would threaten the warlords' immediate base of power. In this model, foreign intervention seeks to develop a broad, inclusive balance of power between the militias to prevent one group from dominating the others. The incentives to warlords to form some degree of political consensus can involve monetary rewards or other special considerations, but the fact the international community has become involved in a failed or collapsed state raises the stakes for warlords. Challenging international coalitions or the United Nations can and has been done, with Aideed in Somalia proving one such example, but the potential costs of becoming enemies with countries like the United States or the United Kingdom should not be taken lightly.⁶⁶ As such, many warlords opt to join or simply tolerate a temporary foreign intervention. But as the foreign intervention pushes for the re-establishment of the state with warlords at the center of a power-sharing scheme, the calculated costs of saying no are high while saying yes appears to instantly strengthen the warlord's position.

The most significant operational consideration under this model for an international intervention is maintaining a perception of neutrality.⁶⁷ The goal is to minimize the chances, incentives, and actions that would prompt one of the warlords to leave the general coalition and threaten the general framework of peace. As such, in order to avoid inflammatory contact with local forces, no significant actions or deployments by international peace-keepers already on the

⁶⁵ Ibid, 70-72.

⁶⁶ For a reflective peace on the Somalia peacekeeping operation, see John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1995).

⁶⁷ Lyons and Samatar, 70-74.

ground would take place without the consent of the warlords. The consolidation of power among the existing framework of militias is paramount so as to make leaving the coalition more costly over time.⁶⁸

Analysts can note that many core elements of this strategy have been implemented in failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan. In Somalia, the UN forces tried to create a coalition between the major warlords in Mogadishu, but the plan ran afoul when they lost the perception of neutrality and wound up engaged with the forces of General Aideed, one of the two most prominent warlords in the capital. Without Aideed's support, a general consensus could not be reached, and US policy-makers decided after the well-known "Blackhawk Down" incident in which 18 Americans were killed and over 70 more wounded that an escalation of conflict with Aideed was not in the best interests of the United States. In Afghanistan, warlords have been invited to share power in a new government. The United States has provided significant money and weapons to many warlords, further entrenching their basis of power. The United States and ISAF have been extremely reluctant to crack down on the abuses and crimes of these warlords for fear that they would leave the coalition and use their relatively powerful militias to destabilize the peace process.

The implications of this model on DDR, however, are significant. Most notably, this model would remove the element of disarmament from the DDR process. This deviation of DDR could be called "accommodation demobilization and re-integration (ADR)." Disarmament would be avoided so as to not disturb the emerging power structure that would underlie a general consensus among warlords.⁶⁹ Through disarmament, if one group perceives that it is either advantaged or disadvantaged, then it would have an incentive to break the consensus.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 70-74.

⁶⁹ Lyons and Samatar, 70-74.

Demobilization and re-integration would initially play less significant roles for the same reasons, but persuading warlords to demobilize their armies while keeping their weapons “just in case” is less likely to cause a shift in power than total disarmament. Further demobilization would serve as a valuable symbolic gesture, and the warlord knows that he is capable of re-mobilizing his already-armed troops if necessary.

Further, for policy considerations, the ADR model operates in a shorter timeframe, seeks to minimize the financial and human costs of intervention, but runs the risk of legitimizing the rule of tyrants and criminals who, despite an improvement in general safety conditions, would continue to run the country for their own advantage.⁷⁰ Another significant risk with this model is that the on-going pervasiveness of weapons continues to threaten the peace and results in violations of human security. Proponents of this model would counter, however, that no disarmament program ever collects all weapons, so a threat always remains. But in this case, since warlord mobilization of combatants is perceived to be the biggest de-stabilizing threat to overall peace, the armaments effectively serve as deterrents to violence as the warlords enter into political accommodation and power sharing. Although the combatants would retain their weapons, they would be locked up and unused at home as long as the warlord had no reason to mobilize that soldier. As Aldo Ajello, the special UN representative in charge of the DDR operation in Mozambique, exclaimed, “I know very well that they will give us old and obsolete materiel, and they will have here and there something hidden. I don’t care. What I do is create the political situation in which the use of those guns is not the question. So that they stay where they are.”⁷¹

⁷⁰ Ibid, 70-74.

⁷¹ Brian Hall, “Blue Helmets, Empty Guns,” New York Times Sunday Magazine 2 January 1994, p. 24.

This model also has certain advantages in coping with some of the underlying characteristics of failed and collapsed states. For example, the problem of a security vacuum is somewhat mitigated by allowing people to keep their weapons to protect their own safety. Second, the problem of legitimate governance is somewhat mitigated over time if the political strategy succeeds in generating a broad political consensus among the warlords. ADR facilitates the formation of this consensus because the lack of disarmament can make the costs of resorting to violence higher if coalition-building fails. A functioning consensus means that the warlords are not mobilizing and employing their armies at pre-consensus levels. Even though a warlord coalition will not have a moral legitimacy, at least the possibility for nation-state legitimacy exists in that they can sustain peace and begin providing positive political goods to its citizenry.

Unfortunately, the ADR model probably provides little relief on the burdens of re-integration in failed states. Even if fewer combatants are demobilized, reducing the strain on scarce resources, the lure of profits from illegal markets will most likely drive some combatants to supplement their earnings through participating in the illicit economic activity. The fact that they are not disarmed suggests that violence stemming from the entrenchment of these illegal activities will increase.

Early in its intervention in Somalia, the United States pursued the political accommodation strategy without any form of DDR; over time, however, the evolution of the mission included disarmament, which then threatened the warlord-based political consensus that Washington supported. At the beginning of the operation, US forces were extremely clear with the local warlords that their stay in Somalia was only for a short time and that it would be in the interests of the warlords to not hinder the Americans so as to speed up their departure.⁷² But

⁷² Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," Learning from Somalia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997) 243.

later, by initiating disarmament instead of following the ADR model, the United States and the United Nations found itself at odds with the warlord Aideed and his militia.

Although the coalition in Afghanistan has implemented much of the political accommodation strategy, it is moving away from the accompanying ADR model. Indeed, with the implementation of the ANBP and disarmament, the coalition risks the stability of its warlord coalition through increased chances of conflicts between coalition and local forces, unbalancing the power structure among warlords (particularly with a powerful warlord like Fahim controlling much the DDR agenda and process), and the emergence of a security vacuum into which other ambitious warlords or the Taliban may step. Continuing the political accommodation strategy while implementing a non-compatible typology of DDR will most likely endanger opportunities for peace and exacerbate the declining security situation.⁷³

Long Term Demobilization, Disarmament, and Re-Integration (LTDDR)

The second common political strategy for nation- and institution-building in failed and collapsed states is called the “Encourage New Institutions” model.⁷⁴ This model holds that “survival” through state collapse is not enough to be accorded legitimacy, and in fact because of their dictatorial and brutal natures, warlords and their private militias are not legitimate institutions on which to build new states. Instead, warlords thrive and profit on chaos and possess few incentives for establishing truly democratic and representative governing institutions. Instead of employing warlords, the international community needs to encourage the empowerment of alternate governing structures.⁷⁵

⁷³ Lyons and Samatar, 70-74.

⁷⁴ Lyons and Samatar, 70-74.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 70-74.

This model posits that the development of new institutions and leaders requires security and time: a strong security umbrella created by an international peacekeeping force, and time to allow new leaders and institutions to flourish on their own. The role of the peacekeepers would be to deter warlord violence against the general population and to ensure that warlord “spoilers” do not endanger the process of cultivating new leaders and civil institutions.

The type of DDR accompanying this model, which could be designated “Long Term DDR” (LTDDR), closely resembles the original template, but with the crucial difference that such a program could be carried out in the absence of a political consensus among warlords because of the strong deterrent presented by the international peacekeeping force.⁷⁶ But, all three DDR phases would be implemented with an eye toward a longer-than-usual schedule and even enacted regionally as opposed to across a country all at the same time.

In reality, implementation of this model requires a significant investment of time and resources from outside parties.⁷⁷ If the international community fails to provide a sufficient peacekeeping force over an extended period of time, this model will fail as the warlords mobilize with impunity against any emerging grass-roots leaders and organizations that would threaten the warlord’s grip on power. The “new institution” political model has not been applied in Somalia or Afghanistan, but the ANBP in Afghanistan resembles the accompanying LTDDR model. However, as noted earlier, mixing a political accommodation strategy with LTDDR appropriate to the New Institutions model could generate a severe conflict that could endanger the entire peace process.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 74.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 70-74.

Target Specific Demobilization, Disarmament, and Re-integration (TSDDR)

A new model of DDR for coping with combatants and breaking the cycle of violence is Target Specific Demobilization, Disarmament, and Re-integration. This model draws upon both scientific and social analysis of the nature of networks in order to identify specific combatants whose disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration would ultimately cripple the ability of warlords to mobilize their private armies.

Researchers have attempted for several years to better understand the phenomenon of “networks” and the structure and interactions within any given network. Over the past few years, researchers of networks across a variety of fields, ranging from computers to biology to business to Hollywood, have discovered that many of these networks are dominated by a relatively small number of nodes that are connected to many other nodes. Networks containing these important and well-connected nodes, or hubs, are called “free-scale networks” because of their hundreds, thousands, or even millions of links appear to have “no scale.”⁷⁸ Common examples of these free-scale networks are the US airline system (a few cities like Chicago serve as major hubs connecting many airports, whereas the average airport has only a few connections to other airports) and the World Wide Web (most pages have less than four links, but a small percentage contain dozens to thousands of links).⁷⁹ These free-scale networks also exist in numerous types of social settings. For example, researchers from the universities of Stanford, Michigan, Arizona, and UC Irvine concluded that the US biotechnology industry constitutes such a network: a few companies (hubs) such as Genzyme, Chiron, and Genetech possess a disproportionably large number of partnerships with other firms (nodes). Hollywood represents another such network. In terms of an actor appearing in the same movie as other actors, most

⁷⁸ Albert-Laszlo Barabasi and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks,” *Scientific American* May 2003, 60-69.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 60-69.

actors actually only have a few links to others, while a few actors such as Rod Steiger and Donald Pleasance actually had thousands of connections. Even citations in academic literature represent a free-scale network, as the most cited literature triggers other researchers to read those pieces and cite them.⁸⁰

These free-scale networks have a few distinguishing characteristics worth noting. First, these networks are remarkably resilient against the accidental failure of a single node; the random elimination of nodes will result mainly in the removal of small nodes because they are much more plentiful than hubs, and their loss will not significantly disrupt the overall functioning of the network. However, these networks are vulnerable to attacks targeted against the hubs. In a simulation of attacks against internet hubs, for example, researchers found that the removal of a few key hubs “splintered” the entire network into tiny groups of “hopelessly isolated routers.”⁸¹ In many systems, the removal of just 5% to 15% of hubs has caused the shutdown of an entire network. Second, researchers have noted two phenomena regarding hubs: new nodes tend to attach themselves to already-established hubs, and as these popular hubs gain new nodes, they outpace their less connected node neighbors in growth.⁸²

The theoretical model of free-scale networks has a direct application to the problem of DDR in failed and collapsed states because warlord politics resembles a free-scale network. Warlord politics tend to be dependent on a high level of patronage politics. In Afghanistan, for example, “Shifts in the allegiance of local commanders have become endemic,” often because of “offers of better remuneration from rival factions.”⁸³ As one Afghan analyst notes, “No *mujahidin* commander ever cuts his links to other parties or countries. All have relationships

⁸⁰ Ibid, 60-69.

⁸¹ Ibid, 66.

⁸² Ibid, 60-69.

⁸³ International Crisis Group, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, 3.

with all parties.” This “flexibility in alignment” suggests that relationships between commanders rarely exist along “strict vertical axes.”⁸⁴ Instead, these mid-level commanders begin to resemble hubs connecting together different warlord factions.

Clan or ethnic affiliations are critical for lower- and mid-level commanders to mobilize men for the warlords. The loyalties of individual soldiers and low-level commanders are generally highly personalized. The key instrument of mobilization is the lowest rung of the *mujahidin* command structure, the *sargroup*, or “team leader.”⁸⁵ These men usually command squad- or platoon-sized units and are relied upon by mid-level commanders to mobilize troops often within 24 hours. *Sargroups* rely upon men from his village or connections to families he can count on to provide men to ensure that he can mobilize enough troops when summoned. *Sargroups* are usually chosen for their significant experience and connections. Several *sargroups* are commanded by a commandant, who in turn is grouped with other commandants under an emir. Emirs usually report to other commanders or else a warlord directly.⁸⁶

The description of *sargroups* and mid-level commanders closely resemble nodes with greater than average connections to other nodes, in this case other soldiers or officers. Additionally, no reason exists to expect that connections among combatants are evenly distributed; it is highly doubtful that the newest and lowliest grunts have the same number of connections as experienced veterans, especially those in operational leadership positions. As outlined before, new nodes tend to attach to older, already well-connected hubs, and this pattern logically holds true for mobilizing militias. New recruits are usually drawn into existing military or clan structures, often under specific leaders from the same village or town, rather than

⁸⁴ Ibid, 3.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 3-4.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 3-4.

initiating their own networks. Thus, rank, experience, and responsibility are both conducive to a few individuals being “hubs.”

Assuming that warlord politics does indeed function similarly to a scale-free network, the lessons regarding the general resilience of the network to accidental node failure and its vulnerability to targeted attacks can be applied in this situation. Statistically, a mass demobilization effort like the ANBP will mostly demobilize common soldiers. A few hubs might be demobilized, but there is no guarantee that they will enter the programs. Plus, because true hubs are not just your average *sargroup* but rather an exceptional *sargroups* or commandants, the odds of catching these individuals in the demobilization process (especially when only roughly one out of six combatants is slated for disarmament under the ANDP anyway) are slim. However, once identified, these hubs could be targeted for DDR, and their ultimate demobilization would significantly impair warlords’ abilities to mobilize and recruit their militias. Optimistically, if the warlord scale-free network operates at all in a similar manner as other tested networks, the removal of possibly just 10% to 15% of all “hub” soldiers could destroy the warlord’s power structure.⁸⁷ Without doubt, though, the demobilization of one of these hubs would result in at least the temporary demobilization of significant numbers of common nodes or troops.

The primary operational consideration of this target specific DDR program would be actually identifying the hubs. In a situation like Afghanistan, good information already exists regarding *mujahidin* and militia structures. The trick lies in identifying the leading *sargroups* and commandants on a local level. Teams of researchers would need to travel to local communities to map out specific clan, ethnic, *mujahidin*, and militia networks in order to identify hubs. As complicated and extensive as this project might sound at first, this procedure is not so

⁸⁷ Barabasi and Bonabeau, 66.

far-fetched. Continuing with the example of Afghanistan, teams already exist to identify units to be included in the general ANBP. A slight modification of their training and mission would allow them to explore in more detail for individuals to identify as hubs. Provincial Reconstruction Teams assembled by the US-led coalition are another set of pre-existing tools deployed in different parts of the country to assist in local development and to collect various data regarding various communities. Incorporating the agenda of identifying potential hubs would be in line with their original mission.

The potential benefits of TSDDR for policy-makers are manifold. First, this plan represents a more effective use of limited DDR resources. For the cost of demobilizing one soldier, the result is the effective demobilization of numerous other combatants. The costs saved in not immediately initiating a mass DDR effort could be applied instead to ensuring that a specific number of targeted soldier hubs are funded and successfully pass through every stage of the DDR process to guarantee that they do not resume their place in the warlord network. Second, in an environment where a security vacuum exists, TSDDR does not put pressure on the average combatant or civilian to surrender his weapon, which he sees as his only potential safeguard. Further, it directly addresses the problem of warlords by directly targeting the key structures underpinning the warlords' power structure. Also, TSDDR avoids adding additional employment strains on the economy or significantly increasing the number of un-employed laborers competing for jobs and resources because specifically designated DDR resources can ensure that these few individuals succeed in the process. Further, warlords should not feel threatened initially about losing just a few men to DDR. Chances are that the warlords themselves are personally unfamiliar with the lower-ranking hubs targeted for DDR. Regardless, TSDDR can be implemented with a much lesser degree of consensus between warlords, and

even if a full consensus fails to emerge, any warlord seeking to avoid a confrontation with the international community will probably agree to a DDR program small in scope and scale like TSDDR. The immediate consequences to his ability to mobilize from this smaller scale TSDDR program will hopefully not be revealed until it is too late for him to reverse the situation. Finally, TSDDR also leaves open the option to implement a larger-scale DDR program at anytime, advisably as long as the mass DDR program does not divert resources from the TSDDR that are needed to ensure the successful processing and re-integration of the hub soldier.

However, a few problems still exist with this new model. A warlord might immediately recognize the threat that TSDDR poses to his power structure and take steps to identify and protect his vulnerable “hubs.” Worse, the warlord could begin actively resisting any political accommodation for fear that the international intervention will ultimately remove him from power. Second, TSDDR is still only a temporary solution. Undoubtedly, new commanders and *sargroups* would replace lost hubs, but the TSDDR does provide windows of opportunity while those hubs are still down. TSDDR should to be implemented within a larger context of economic and political development in order to maximize its effectiveness.

Combining the Models

One analyst has noted that, “The authoritarian solution [ADR], perhaps more promising in the short run, in the long run is very likely to lead to a new cycle of discontent and collapse. The democratic solution [LTDDR] is certainly the most desirable and probably the only viable one in the long run, but it is unfortunately the most difficult to implement in the short run.”⁸⁸ That said, the new TSDDR model could serve as a bridge between the transition from one set of political and DDR strategies to the other. The initial implementation of the accommodation

⁸⁸ Ottaway, 235.

model would serve as a politically feasible, low cost way of working toward establishing some degree of political consensus among the warlords. The ADR tools should not threaten any warlord, but they still accomplish, however minimal, some reduction in the level of violence, conflict, and insecurity in the country. As the warlords become more involved in the political process and the stakes for withdrawing increase, TSDDR should begin with the purpose of disrupting the warlords' abilities to mobilize soldiers to fight each other or attack the civilian population, especially rising leaders and institutions. The initial implementation of ADR gives research teams time to discover the "hubs" while the intervening countries develop a working relationship with the warlord; he is not threatened by ADR and lulled into a sense of complacency so that he does not recognize the subtle shift to TSDDR until it is too late. Ultimately, once enough hubs have been demobilized and other political considerations allow, the longer-term strategy for state-building and LTDDR can be implemented. The warlords' militia networks will have been severely disrupted by the targeted removal of specific hubs that interconnected the network. A fuller DDR program targeting the masses can then be implemented as more necessary conditions for either LTDDR or the standard DDR templates have been met. Without their traditional power-base or access to manpower, and with the rise of legitimate governing institutions, the removal of warlords would be the final objective.

Looking to the Future

The two DDR deviations ADR and LTDDR both have strengths and weaknesses meriting closer scrutiny and consideration. So, too, does the TSDDR model require further analysis, specifically in relation to the formulation and training of special teams to map hubs and nodes among clans and warlord militias. Further, the problems related to this model require closer

analysis to create a more satisfactory solution. Additional consideration regarding the potential costs and benefits of a strategy moving from ADR and TSDDR to LTDDR and TSDDR would be beneficial toward operationalizing this plan. Additionally, since this new TSDDR model has not yet been tested or implemented anywhere, drawing definitive conclusions about its validity remains an academic endeavor. However, a pilot project of this model involving one relatively isolated warlord network could be considered for immediate supplementation to the ANBP in Afghanistan. Modifying the standard DDR template enacted in the ANBP should not prove too difficult if initiated in the projects early stages. But, as standard DDR continues in the ANBP, the costs of conversion to TSDDR will rise and become less likely over time. Further, as new research reveals critical properties and patterns in social free-scale networks, so, too should they be considered for incorporation into the understanding of free-scale networks for TSDDR purposes. Additional risks, benefits, and operational considerations of this model should also spur more research and analysis.

Similarly, the political economy of job creation, a critical element of re-integration, represents a field of research waiting to be tapped by analysts across several academic fields. In a similar vein, closer examination of the incentive structures motivating the behavior of warlords would prove insightful in designing strategies that would ultimately replace warlordism with viable governing institutions and a legitimate democracy. William Reno's work Warlord Politics and African States provides an insightful basis for further exploration into the important relationships between markets, warlords, and incentive-based behavior.

Although the relationship between security and development is no longer in question, the tools to achieve both require constant examination and fine-tuning. Even as DDR became a

common solution for handling ex-combatants in post-conflict situations, the emergence of failed and collapsed states has demonstrated that the standard tools and assumptions were inadequate for these situations. The development of new assumptions and tools, such as TSDDR, represents progress toward adjusting to the dynamics of a changing world. But the analysis and testing must continue so that the international community will be prepared to build on the past to produce new, creative remedies for a new and inevitable emerging affliction.

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